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Emeriging constitutional conflicts and the role of courts 
JOHN GR~BE 
Constitutional Connectlons 
I n Marbury v. Madison, decided in 1803, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: "It is em-
phatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what 
the law is." 
Ma.FShall made this statement in 
the course of explaining why the 
court should not enforce a federal 
statute that conflicted with the Con-
stitution. The statement thus served 
to justify the practice of judicial re. 
view. But what if anything does it im-
ply about how actively courts should 
seek to define constitutional bound-
aries? 
Does the Marbury statement. 
merely seek to justify a straightlor-
ward choice-of-law principle - i.e., 
that courts must enforce superior Jaw 
<such as constitutional law) when 
faced with situatiohs where superior 
and inferior laws conflict? 
Or does it suggest that the courts 
should play a special role in maintain-
ing our constitutional equilibrium -
i.~. that interpreting the Constitution 
is a particularly 1.egal exercise in 
which judges have special expertise? 
If the latter meaning was intended, 
the statement might well be taken as 
ajudicial call to action. 
Throughout its history, the 
Supreme Court. has at tiines em~ 
braced the former view, and at other 
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times the latter. 
Advocates for the former, 
more restrained view empha-
size that it functions as a pro-
democracy default rule. And 
they see this as a good thing. 
When a court exercises ju-
dicial review, it tells 
Congress, the executive 
branch or a state to refrain 
from action tbat is under way 
or to take some action that is 
not being taken. Either way, a 
democratically accountable 
institution is told that it can-
not do what the people (pre-
sumably) want it to do, or that 
it must do what the people 
(presumably) do not want it to 
do. 
Advocates fur judicial re- ' 
straint say that such occa-
sions should be kept to a min-
imum. It is destabilizing when 
courts tell democratic majori-
ties that they cannot have 
their way. And it can be dan-
gerous when courts do so 
with frequency or without suf-
ficient sensitivity to the politi-
cal consequences. 
Note that this view does 
not necessarily involve. a lim-
ited conception of the breadth 
of constitutional rights. One 
might well believe, for exam-
ple, that the Constitution 
should be broadly read to pro-
tect a right to abortion or to 
same-sex marriage while si-
multaneously believing that 
the judiciary should be cau-
tious about involving itself.in 
controversies that implicate 
issues such as these. 
Judges holding the re-
strained view tend to favor 
what law professor Alexander 
Bickel called "the passive 
virtues" of inaction. For ex-
ample, when faced with a law· 
suit raising a constitutional 
claim, they do .not lightly con-
clude that the plaintiff has 
suffered an irtjury sufficient to 
confer "standing'' to litigate 
the cas.e. And if the plaintiff 
does have standing, they tend 
to look for non-constitutional 
grounds on which to decide 
the case. Finally, if they must 
issue a constitutional ruling, 
they tend to state it in the 
narrowest possible terms. 
Advocates for a broader 
understanding of the Mar-
bury statement tend to em-
phasize the hazards of unbri-
. died democracy, the threat 
posed by political dysfunction 
and the need to protect .mi-
nority rights. They argue that 
if the Constitution is to en-
dure, there must be a method 
fot operationalizing it when 
its llinitations are viewed as 
inexpedient by those who hold 
pPwer in the political 
branches. 
History teaches, they say, 
that robust exercises of the 
power of judicial review are 
necessary to keep us, in the 
words of John Adams, a "gov-
ernment of laws, and not of 
men." Judges are by~ 
inclined toward the vindiat-
tion of principle. And the 
framers gave federal judges 
lifetime tenure and salary 
protection precisely because 
they saw a need for a branch 
of the federal government to 
take the long view. 
We appear to be headed 
into a period that will be rife 
with constitutional conflicts. 
Some of these conflicts will 
become lawsuits. How will the 
courts respond? How should 
they respond? 
Just this week, a govern-
ment accountability organiza- sufficient to give it the stand-
tion filed a lawsuit claiming ing to litiga:te these issues. 
that, by failing to divest from The organization claims 
ownership of businesses that that President Trump's un-
.receive payments from enti- ' constitutional conduct is 
ties owned by foreigp. govern- causing it to divert resources 
ments1 President Donald from other government ac-
Trump is violating the Consti- countability projects in order 
tution's Fbreign Emoluments to monitor him. Is this enough 
Clause. This clause prohibits to confer standing? In decid-
e person holding ''any Office ing this quesUon, the.court 
of Profit.or Trust" from ac- will have to define and apply 
cepting any "Emolument" the concept of "injury." But it 
from a foreign state. also will be giving a new gloss 
There is a lively debate to Justice Marshall's old 
about whether the president maxim about the scope of the 
holds an "Office of Profit or judicial role. 
Trust" within the meaning of 
the clause and, if so, whether 
a payment received by his one 
of his businesses constitutes 
an "Emolument." But the 
case also presents a _signifi-
cant threshold question: 
whether the plaintiff. organiza-
tion has suffered an irtjury 
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